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This paper contributes to the literature on capital flight by investigating the relationship between 
kidnapping rate and capital flight in developing countries. Numerous empirical studies exist on the 
determinants of capital flight but, surprisingly, none of them have investigated the empirical link 
between kidnapping and capital flight. To fill this existing void in the literature, this paper utilised 
a sample of 67 developing countries for the period 2003-2017. Estimates of the GMM technique 
show that kidnapping rate has a positive and significant impact on capital flight. However, 
estimations of the marginal differences show that this significant effect remained consistent only 
in the sample of ‘fragile’ developing countries. The results remained consistent to alternative 
measures of capital flight.  
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1. Introduction  
In developing countries, kidnapping is relatively a common occurrence (Fink and Pingle, 2014), 
and, unfortunately, in those countries, kidnapping for ransom has become a global industry with 
recorded incidents running into tens of thousands each year (Stubbert et al. 2015). Incidents of 
kidnapping in the developing countries under review increased by 179% from 2003 to 2017 
(UNODC, 2020). The adverse impact of kidnapping ranges from psychological and physical 
effects (Alexander and Klein, 2009) to severe economic consequences (Vergara, 2012; Munshi, 
2019). This study’s interest is the economic consequences of kidnapping in developing countries. 
One of the ways to capture this potential economic consequence is to look at capital flight. Capital 
flight is a source of serious concern for developing countries given the importance of external 
capital inflow in filling the domestic savings gap and supplementing domestic investments. There 
are numerous studies that have investigated the determinants of capital flight (e.g., Boyce, 1992; 
Gibson and Tsakalotos, 1993; Leblang, 1997; Collier et al. 2004; Ndikumana and Boyce, 2011; 
Brada et al. 2013; Ellyne and Mbewe, 2015; Muchai and Muchai, 2016; Ramiandrisoa and 
Rakotomanana, 2016; Salandy and Henry, 2018). These studies often conclude that external debt, 
taxation, political regimes, economic liberalisation, and measures of economic performance 
influence capital flight.       
 In the literature that is related to this paper, some empirical studies have investigated the 
relationship between terrorism and/or general political instability on capital flight (see, Alam and 
Quazi, 2003; Fielding, 2004; Efobi and Asongu, 2016; Shahzad and Qin, 2019; and Asongu et al. 
2019). However, our study differs from these existing studies by focusing instead on crime. 
Although similarities exist between crime and terrorism, there are specific and significant 
differences that still exist between the two (Hutchinson and O’malley, 2007; Shelley and Melzer, 
2008; Mullins, 2009). While crime is mainly motivated by material and economic gains, terrorism 
is ideologically driven and motivated by a desire for political and cultural change (Bovenkerk and 
Chakra, 2005). For this study, crime was captured with the kidnapping rate in the developing 
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countries under study. There are several rational arguments that have been provided to support 
the channels through which the associated effects of kidnapping may accelerate capital flight. 
Unsafe environments associated with high rates of kidnapping can dissuade wealth owners from 
investing in such countries (Carboni and Detotto, 2016). There is also the potential that continuous 
incidents of kidnapping can create a negative shock on wealth by disrupting labour market 
outcomes. Furthermore, trust and social cohesion are very important for investment activities. 
However, kidnapping can erode those, thereby deterring the needed investments necessary to 
sustain capital inflows or accumulate existing stocks of capital (Robles et al. 2013).  
Therefore, the central question for this paper is, does kidnapping accelerate capital flight in 
developing countries? It is quite surprising that existing studies on the determinants of capital flight 
have yet to answer this question. Thus, this is the primary motivation of this study and three main 
contributions were deduced from this. First, we showed new evidence of the negative 
consequences of kidnapping. This new evidence we have shown in this study, will help extend and 
deepen what is already known of how kidnapping impedes on economic activities, particularly, for 
developing countries. Second, our study is extended by estimating the marginal differences on the 
impact of kidnapping on capital flight based on country ‘fragility’1. There is an existing argument 
that the consequences of adverse incidents, like terrorism, political instability, and crime, may affect 
countries differently based on their levels of ‘fragility’ (Essaddam and Karagianis, 2014; Tingbani 
et al. 2019). Third, these new findings will provide policymakers in developing and ‘fragile’ 
countries with a much stronger evidence of the importance of well-functioning institutions and 
the need to adopt appropriate steps that can help cushion the negative impact of kidnapping. To 
help answer our main research question and to fill this existing void in the literature, we employed 
a sample of 67 developing countries for which data on kidnapping rate were reasonably available 
over the period 2003-2017. The results of the GMM estimations showed that kidnapping rate was 
 
1 ‘Fragility’ is a broad term associated with countries in which their governments are no longer able to control every 
part of their territories. 
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positive and significant to capital flight. An increase in kidnapping rate by 1 per 100,000 of the 
population would increase capital flight by a 1.3652 percentage point of GDP. However, the 
significant effect of the relationship between kidnapping rate and capital flight was only sustained 
in the group of ‘fragile’ developing countries.  
The rest of the paper is structured accordingly. Section 2 presents a review of the literature on the 
potential channels through which kidnapping or, generally, crime can affect capital flight. In 
section 3, the sample and data will be presented. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy. The 
results are discussed in section 5. The final section concludes the paper.  
 
2. Brief Review of Literature and Hypothesis Development 
Developing countries are believed to be confronted with the problems of high levels of capital 
flight. Although the problem of capital is of global concern, it is believed to be more severe in 
developing countries (Ndikumana and Boyce, 2002; Collier et al., 2001). This shows that there is 
a variation on the level of capital flight, and a scholarly consensus seems to attach this variation to 
numerous macroeconomic and political uncertainties in developing countries. These uncertainties 
could present a catalyst for the acceleration of capital flight because rational investors are likely to 
move their investment to safe havens (Carboni and Detotto, 2016). Crime is one of the major 
obstacles or uncertainties facing developing countries. On a macro level, crime impacts negatively 
on international economic relations, and on a micro level it is a direct attack on safety and public 
order (Brown, 2001). Furthermore, it impacts negatively on productive activities, increases the cost 
of doing business, discourages private entrepreneurs, and represents a threat to property and life 
(Pinotti, 2015; Enamorado et al. 2014).  
From a theoretical lens, these two theories – institutional theory and investment diversion thesis – can be 
used to explain some of the determinants of kidnapping in developing countries. According to the 
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institutional theory, institutions exist to maintain order and reduce uncertainty across economies. This 
argument is supported by North (1992) and Roxas and Chadee (2011), whereby they opined that 
institutions are designed to maintain order and reduce uncertainty, thereby making the 
environment less expensive. However, this is not always the case especially in developing countries. 
Hence the persistence of social vices such as kidnapping and other forms of crime. Also, the 
investment diversion thesis posits that, due to the better investment opportunities and macroeconomic 
stability in developed countries (Forgha, 2008), some bureaucrats and public officials in developing 
countries corruptly transfer stolen funds abroad. Such an illegal transfer of funds reduces 
investment in developing countries and affects the availability of financial capital. In the long run, 
this leads to a high level of unemployment. Studies have shown that a high level of unemployment 
in developing countries has been one of the major determinants of kidnapping (Ugwuoke, 2011).  
On an empirical level, there is a dearth of studies, or none at all, that has investigated the 
relationship between kidnapping and capital flight. Thus, our empirical review of the literature 
would discuss, generally, some of the negative effects of crime on investment. In their study, 
Daniele and Marani (2011) showed that organised crime such as kidnapping and an organised 
mafia were disincentives to investment in the Southern region of Italy. Their argument is that 
crime in the region reduced its attractiveness. Ganau and Rodriguez-Pose (2017) also showed that 
organised crime negatively affected firms’ productivity growth. According to their study, crime 
reduces trust among people, hinders competitiveness, weakens the established local industrial 
structure, and harms the existing market relationships among local firms. All of which increases 
the cost of business operations. Ashby and Ramos (2013) also found that the impact of crime, as 
captured by the homicide rate, had a negative relationship to investment in financial management 
and real estate services. Pearlman (2014) also found out that crime, such as robbery and extortion, 
reduced income growth among microenterprises in Mexico. Their findings were attributed to the 
fact that crime serves as a disincentive for investment. Cabral et al. (2016) also investigated the 
effects of drug-related crimes on labour productivity across 32 sub-national entities of Mexico. 
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Their study concluded, overall, the negative and statistical effect of crime on labour productivity. 
One of the arguments provided in support of the findings is that crimes are associated with panic, 
which could have a negative impact on economic activity through the temporal or permanent 
closures of businesses and other related activities. The negative impact of crime in South Africa 
was also emphasised in a study by Moyo (2002). Theft, robbery, arson, and vandalism had a 
negative impact on the activities of firms.  
   Argumentatively and in support of the empirical literature, there are other plausible reasons to 
expect a positive relationship between kidnapping and capital flight in our study. Incidence of 
crime can accelerate the capital flight by inhibiting the accumulation of physical and human capital 
stock including, distorting the economic system, and increasing the uncertainty of the business 
environment. As a result, there is likely to be reductions in profitability, returns on investments, 
and growth in economic activities. The prevalence of crime also increases the cost of doing 
business and can lead to market inefficiencies, economic distortions, business failures, and as a 
result, viable businesses and economic activities may relocate to safer countries (Yepes et al. 2015; 
Brown and Hibbert, 2017). All these are likely to increase the rate of capital flight from a country 
by disincentivising investors (Brown and Hibbert, 2019). There is also the psychological effect 
associated with crime that can influence the investment decision-making of owners of wealth 
thereby, reducing their willingness to adding to their stock of capital investment and thus, resulting 
to an increase in capital flight (Robles et al. 2013). Finally, sound financial institutions are important 
determinant in the accumulation of capital. However, financial institutions will be adversely 
affected if investors attach significant risks to the financial market due to the prevalence of crime.  





The impact of kidnapping may not be the same across countries. For example, in ‘fragile’ countries, 
there is a sustained degradation of the preconditions relevant for markets to exist. This also 
includes the absence of strong institutions and governance structures (Fligstein, 2001; Rotberg, 
2003). Such countries will find it difficult to deal with incidents of kidnapping and the associated 
aftereffects. Thus, the argument of there being a different and more accelerating effect of 
kidnapping on capital flight in ‘fragile’ countries is somewhat justifiable. Some studies have 
established similar lines of arguments on the effects of political instability in ‘fragile’ countries. 
Reade and Lee (2012) showed that businesses operating in terror-endangered areas, particularly 
‘fragile’ countries, were more likely to face challenges from the organisational commitment of their 
workforce compared to their counterparts that were operating in less terror-endangered areas. 
Tingbani et al. (2019) also showed that the effect of terrorism on business failure was more 
apparent in ‘fragile’ countries.  
In addition to the above empirical arguments, ‘fragility’ will hamper the ability of countries to 
sustain and accumulate capital because their competitiveness as destination countries for capital 
inflow is weak. There is also a tendency that criminal activities in such countries can be exacerbated 
due to their weak institutions and if this creates serious market distortions, can affect economic 
activities such as the demand for goods and services. Such crowding out of economic activities 
and the presence of weak institutions to cushion the effects of crime can make fragile countries 
more susceptible to capital flight (Brown and Hibbert, 2017). Furthermore, capital flight in ‘fragile’ 
countries is likely to be more due to the associated political and expropriation risks that characterise 
them. Such risks greatly reduce the confidence investors and owners of wealth have in such 
countries and their government (Benton, 2017). Finally, ‘fragile’ countries suffer more from 
inappropriate fiscal, political, and social policies which reduce their international competitiveness 
as destination environments for investment and accumulation of capital. They are often unable to 
sustain investments or maintain their attractiveness to investments due their weak institutions and 
poorly implemented policies. Thus, all things being equal, such countries are more likely to record 
8 
 
capital flight when crime is prevalent (McCloud and Delgado, 2018). Given the above argument 
and supporting studies, we hypothesise as follows: 
H2: The impact of kidnapping on capital flight will be more in ‘fragile’ developing 
countries  
 
3. Sample and Data  
3.1 Sample Construction  
The data for this study were collected from the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI) and 
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The data collected were for developing 
countries for which the data for the main independent variable was available. In all, a total of 67 
countries were employed for the analysis. Furthermore, the sample was disaggregated into ‘fragile’ 
(21 countries) and ‘less fragile’ (46 countries) developing countries2. These fragile countries are 
known for high levels of insecurity, and in our sample, they contribute approximately to 90% of 
the total number of kidnapping incidents. This category has also been adopted by other studies 
(see, Okafor and Piesse, 2017 and Tingbani et al. 2019). Therefore, disaggregating the data would 
allow for the estimation of marginal differences on the impact of kidnapping on capital flight. The 
period 2003-2017 was employed for the analyses and this was guided by the availability of data. 
For some of the main variables, the data before 2003 and after 2017 were not available. The sample 
of countries used in the study is presented in table 1. 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
3.2 Variable Description  
 
2See the FSI, 2019 report for fragile countries’ ranking.  
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a. Dependent Variable  
Capital flight (% of GDP) was used as the main dependent variable for this study. Capital flight 
refers to the outflows of private capital from a country in a given period of time (Davies, 2011). 
As with most studies (e.g., Alam and Quazi, 2003; Al-Fayounmi et al. 2012), and with a measure 
that can be easily measured and obtained, we adopt the World Bank (1985) measure of capital 
flight. This measure is known as the indirect approach and sums the change in external debt and 
inflows of foreign direct investment, and then subtracts the current account deficit plus the 
increase in official reserves (Fedderke and Liu, 2002; Alam and Quazi, 2003)3. The rationale for 
the indirect approach is that the increases in indebtedness and foreign direct investment are used 
to finance either the current account deficit or the official reserve accumulation. Thus, any shortfall 
is viewed as private foreign asset accumulation, which is associated with capital flight. Particularly, 
for developing countries, the argument for using the indirect approach is because of the associated 
problems with using the short-term changes in foreign assets (direct approach) in capturing capital 
flight. The direct approach looks at capital flight as the changes in the foreign assets of domestic 
residents, and, thus, changes in short-term foreign assets can then indicate capital flight. However, 
the direct approach is often criticised because unrecorded capital outflows are not captured in this 
way, and because no clear difference exists between long-term and short-term investments 
(Eggerstedt et al. 1995).  
Nevertheless, it is important to subject our analysis to some robustness tests. Thus, given the 
argument on the shortcomings of using short-term assets, we computed the direct approach of 
capital flight using the change in the sum of the foreign assets (not short-term) of private banks. 
More so, data for short-term assets by the banking system cannot be easily obtained. The direct 
 
3 Mathematically, this is denoted as 
capital flight = change in external debt + foreign direct investment inflows – current account deficit – change in 
foreign reserves.  
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approach assumes that private banks do not engage in capital flight, and, thus, changes in foreign 
assets should be excluded (Alam and Quazi, 2003)4.  
b. Main Independent Variable  
The main independent variable was the number of kidnapping incidents. According to the 
UNODC, kidnapping is the unlawful detainment and taking away of a person against their will for 
the purpose of demanding an illicit gain or material benefit for their liberation, or in order to oblige 
someone to do or not to do something. However, to allow for consistency, appropriate scaling, 
and better comparability across countries, the number of kidnapping incidents was normalised per 
100,000 of population (kidnapping rate).  
c. Control variables  
The study also employed some of the control variables known in the literature that can influence 
capital flight. In this study, we adopt some of these variables and they include volatility in GDP 
growth rate, inflation, a measure of the availability of natural resources, trade openness, foreign 
aid, savings, and real exchange rate. The literature lacks a theoretical framework that guides the 
empirical modelling of capital flight and crime. Therefore, our study is guided by some of these 
exogenous variables, as mentioned above, that the existing studies on capital flight and 
terrorism/political instability have adopted (see, Lensink et al. 2000; Alam and Quazi, 2003; Efobi 
and Asongu, 2016).  
Developing countries are known for their high growth volatility (Easterly et al. 2000; Sheng, 2010), 
and this has significant implications on different macroeconomic factors (Ahamada and Coulibaly, 
2011; Lin and Kim, 2004). Volatility in growth creates macroeconomic instability (Ahmed and 
Suardi, 2009), and this can discourage investors from taking advantage of investment opportunities 
 
4 Mathematically, this is denoted as 
capital flight = change in external debt + foreign direct investment inflows – current account deficit – change in 
foreign reserves – change in foreign assets of private banks. 
11 
 
in the domestic market, thereby accelerating the rate of capital flight (Duman et al. 2005). Similarly, 
high levels of inflation can accelerate capital flight by making the assets denominated in the local 
currency to be less attractive in comparison to those denominated in a foreign currency 
(Ndikumana and Boyce, 2003). Furthermore, inflation is seen as a sign of the deterioration of the 
local currency, which leads to an increase in the expected return to, and the demand for, foreign 
currency. The overall effect is, therefore, an increase in the risk of investment, less of a desire of 
holding domestic financial assets, and subsequently capital flight (Harrigan et al. 2002). The 
availability of natural resources, which is captured in our study with oil rents (% of GDP), can 
reduce capital flight by providing a vehicle for rent-seeking foreign capital inflows. Although, 
natural resources may also accelerate capital flight if the revenue from natural resource exploitation 
is used to finance capital flight (Kwaramba et al. 2016; Ndikumana and Sarr, 2019). Trade openness 
is also known as an important determinant of capital flight, particularly with practices such as 
transfer pricing and mis-invoicing of exports and imports (Aizenman and Noy, 2009; Efobi and 
Asongu, 2016; Asongu and Amankwah-Amoah, 2016).  
Foreign aid can positively influence capital flight (Ndikumana and Boyce, 2003) by facilitating the 
foreign exchange needed for the liquidity in support of capital outflow. In addition, an increase in 
foreign exchange, due to the inflows of foreign aid, can lead to the appreciation of local currency. 
However, this is likely to be in the short-run, which is, thus, not sustainable in the long-run. 
Residents may, therefore, switch out of domestic assets because of an anticipation of an eventual 
depreciation of the local currency. Finally, there is also the possibility of a ‘crowding out’ effect 
that pushes domestic capital abroad, since foreign aid finances many investments projects that are 
linked abroad (Alam and Quazi, 2003; Quazi, 2004). Savings can help an economy to overcome a 
low-growth trap by increasing the availability of the financial resources needed for productive 
domestic investments (Ndikumana, 2014). Thus, with productive domestic investments, wealth 
owners would be less inclined to move their assets abroad. Furthermore, increases in savings will 
broaden the capital and money markets, which provide wealth owners with a variety of financial 
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instruments, thereby reducing capital flight (Ajayi, 2000). The devaluation of the local currency is 
rationally expected to lead to capital flight. This is because currency devaluation often follows with 
an erosion of the domestic assets with respect to foreign assets and welfare losses for wealth 
owners (Alam and Quazi, 2003; Hermes et al. 2002). The variable category and description are 
presented in table 2.  
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
 
3.3 Summary Statistics  
The summary statistics are presented in table 3. At the mean, capital flight (% of GDP) is 8.8062. 
In real terms, this is USD6.08 billion. The maximum value is 117.5610 (% of GDP) while the 
minimum is –65.5455 (% of GDP). Based on the percentiles, 75% of the sampled countries have 
capital flight (% of GDP) that is less than 15.5556 (% of GDP) (USD4.70 billion). The direct 
approach of capital flight, which is the alternative measure for the dependent variable, is 6.4829 % 
of GDP (in real terms USD3.24 billion) at mean, and in 75% of the sampled countries, this was 
below 14.7361 (% of GDP). These figures for capital flight are quite high, considering the fact that 
the countries under study are developing ones. With respect to kidnapping, the countries in the 
sample recorded an average of 1.5417 (per 100,000 of population). However, 25% of the countries 
in the sample recorded less than 0.1460 (per 100,000 of population). Similar interpretations hold 
for the control variables. In table 4 are the correlation coefficients of the variables used. From the 
correlation outputs, there appears not to be any concerns from potential multicollinearity issues.  




4. Empirical Strategy  
The study employed a sample of 67 developing countries for which data was available. 
Furthermore, to estimate marginal differences on the impact of kidnapping rate on capital flight, 
the sample was disaggregated into ‘fragile’ (21 countries) and ‘less fragile’ (46 countries). The data 
was annual and from the period 2003–2017. The baseline regression was estimated using the OLS 
technique. However, to control for unobserved factors that are time invariant within our sample, 
and for possible heterogeneity across our sample countries, the data was further estimated using 
the fixed effects technique. The fixed effects model also allows for greater degrees of freedom and 
more explanatory power in the regression (Baltagi, 1995; Gujarati, 2004). The fixed effects 
equation is mathematically expressed as 
 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  ∗ 𝐾𝑖𝑑𝑛𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡  +  ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ(𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖𝑡 +  ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  ∗ 𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 +
 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  ∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡 +  ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡  +  ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                            (1) 
where 𝑖 and 𝑡 represent individual country and time, 𝛼 and  are the coefficients to be estimated, 
and 
𝑖
 and 𝑣𝑖𝑡 represent the disturbance term – country-specific effects and random errors 
distributed.  
Irrespective of the superiority of the fixed effects technique over the OLS technique, there may 
be a potential for reverse causality (or endogeneity) on the relationship between capital flight and 
kidnapping rate. Economic depression, lack of entrepreneurial activities, limited economic 
opportunities, and low levels of productive investments due to capital flight can contribute to a 
higher unemployment rate in developing countries. Subsequently, higher unemployment rate is 
one of the factors that can lower the opportunity cost of individuals participating in kidnapping, 
needed to fulfil their monetary or material needs brought about by unemployment (Osumah and 
Aghedo, 2011). Thus, the relationship may also run from capital flight to kidnapping. To help 
address this concern, we employed the two-stage system Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM). The relevant diagnostics and tests showed that estimates of the system GMM are 
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preferred to those of the difference GMM. Furthermore, the GMM technique helps address any 
problems of unobserved characteristics assuming that our explanatory variables are not completely 
exogenous (Blundell et al. 2000; Bond et al. 2001). The GMM equation is mathematically expressed 
as  
 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑡 =  𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 +  ∗ 𝐾𝑖𝑑𝑛𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡  +  ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ(𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖𝑡 +  ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  ∗
𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  ∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡 +  ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡  +  ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                   (2) 
 
 
5. Results and Discussions   
a. Baseline Regression 
Results of the baseline regression are shown in table 5 (model 1). Kidnapping rate was positive but 
statistically insignificant to capital flight. However, given possible heterogeneity across our sample 
and the inability of the OLS to control for time invariant unobservable factors, the estimates of 
the baseline regression may be inconsistent. Therefore, discussions of the empirical results will not 
be weighted towards estimates of the OLS regression. Nevertheless, the result still points to a 
positive economic relationship between kidnapping rate and capital flight. The result of the fixed 
effects (table 5, model 2), which controls for time invariant factors, was positive but insignificant. 
Again, the result of the fixed effects may still not be consistent if there is a possibility that the 
relationship also runs from capital flight to kidnapping rate. This leaves our study with estimates 
of the GMM that are the most consistent, and, thus, the discussions of our results will be waited 
in favour of the GMM results. For the GMM estimation (table 5, model 3), kidnapping rate is 
positive and significant to capital flight. The size of the coefficient is also larger. An increase in 
kidnapping rate by 1 will increase capital flight by 1.3652 percentage points of GDP. There is also 
a confirmation of the capital flight trap as can be seen in the positive and significant impact of the 
lagged capital flight. Thus, our hypothesis 1 of a positive relationship between kidnapping rate and 
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capital flight is accepted. We employ some arguments to explain the reasons why our results have 
shown a positive relationship between kidnapping rate and capital flight.  
 
INSERT TABLE 5 
First, kidnapping is one of several typologies of crime and its effect, can create economic and 
investment uncertainties. The implication is that there is a lack of incentives on the part of wealth 
owners to invest in countries that are perceived as unsafe, and hence, an increase in capital flight 
(Carboni and Detotto, 2016). Second, the psychological fear associated with being kidnapped can 
significantly alter the behaviour, consumption, and commercial activities of wealth owners. Such 
persistent alterations and behavioural changes would, amongst other things, most likely encourage 
capital flight (Robles et al. 2013). Third, kidnapping and associated crimes can create a negative 
shock on wealth and may also disrupt labour market outcomes. Therefore, if these factors result 
in a reduction in household income levels, and, subsequently, poor economic performance through 
a reduction in demand, then there is likely to be an increase in capital flight (Velasquez et al. 2019). 
Fourth, interpersonal trust and freedom are important for engaging in investment activities. 
However, incidences of kidnapping have the potential of eroding trust, freedom, and social 
cohesion. In the absence of these factors, there is likely to be an increase in capital flight (Robles 
et al. 2013).  
With respect to the control variables, the results are mainly consistent across the estimation 
techniques. However, the discussions will be weighted towards the estimates of the GMM 
technique (table 5, model 3). The volatility in the growth rate of GDP is positive and significant 
to capital flight. This is consistent with the argument that volatility in growth creates 
macroeconomic instability, which can reduce the incentives of investors, and, thus, accelerate 
capital flight (Ahmed and Suardi, 2009). Inflation is negative but insignificant. This is against the 
expectation of a positive and significant relationship with capital flight. Nevertheless, this finding 
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is consistent with some existing studies (e.g., Harrigan et al. 2002; Ndikumana and Boyce 2003; 
Ljungwall and Wang, 2008) that have either concluded on a negative or insignificant relationship 
between inflation and capital flight. A negative relationship is economically supported if domestic 
inflation leads to a large portfolio shift towards domestic inflation hedges and away from the 
demand for foreign assets (Harrigan et al. 2002). Oil rent was negative but insignificant. Therefore, 
a convincing statistical argument cannot be established that rents from oil have reduced capital 
flight by providing a vehicle for rent-seeking foreign capital inflows.  
Openness to trade was positive and significantly related to capital flight. This is consistent with 
existing findings and confirms the possibility that transfer pricing and mis-invoicing of exports 
and imports, which are easily practiced with increased trade openness, can accelerate capital flight 
(Asongu and Amankwah-Amoah, 2016).  
Similarly, foreign aid is positive and significant. An increase in foreign aid can facilitate the foreign 
exchange and liquidity needed to support capital flow (Ndikumana and Boyce, 2003) and this may 
potentially be explaining this positive relationship in our sample countries. As expected, savings 
rate is negative and significantly related to capital flight. The availability of financial resources, as 
can be implied from increased savings, can potentially stimulate productive domestic investments, 
broaden the capital and money markets, and, subsequently, reduce any outflows of capital 
(Ndikumana, 2014). The positive impact of the exchange rate supports the argument that 
devaluation of the local currency can lead to capital flight by making the acquisition of foreign 
assets more desirable (Hermes et al. 2002).  
b. Robustness to an Alternative Specification 
We re-estimated our regression by employing an alternative measure of capital flight (direct 
approach). This approach measures capital flight by excluding the foreign assets of the private 
banking system. This is because an argument can be rationalised by claiming that private banks do 
not engage in capital flight since inter-bank transfers are essential components of international 
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financial intermediation (Azam and Quazi, 2003). Table 6 presents the results of this alternative 
specification. The results are consistent and very similar (with only slight differences in the sizes 
of the coefficients) to a previous analysis that used the indirect measure of capital flight. An 
increase in kidnapping rate (table 6, model 3) by 1 will increase capital flight by 1.2467 percentage 
points of GDP. The same argument presented in the previous section in support of these findings 
can still be applied here as well.   
 
INSERT TABLE 6 
c. Estimations of Marginal Differences  
It is important that our analysis considers any marginal differences5, based on the country 
classification, on the impact of kidnapping rate on capital flight. To benchmark this category, we 
adopt the Fragile State Index (FSI) classification of countries based on their level of ‘fragility’. 
‘Fragility’ is a broad term associated with countries in which their governments are no longer able 
to control every part of their territories. First, there are existing studies that have supported the 
relationship between fragility and kidnapping (Lewis, 2013; Pires et al. 2017). Second, in our 
sample, countries classed as ‘fragile’ by the FSI have contributed to almost 90% of all kidnapping 
incidents. The results of the ‘fragile’ and ‘less fragile’ marginal difference estimations are shown in 
table 7. The results showed that kidnapping rate is positive but only significant in the sample of 
‘fragile’ countries. Thus, our hypothesis 2 that the impact of kidnapping on capital flight will be 
more in ‘fragile’ countries is accepted. We can justify this finding as follows. First, countries that 
are already ‘fragile’ will find it very difficult to combat crime and they may also lack the institutions 
required to mitigate against the aftermath of crimes (Pires et al. 2017). Second, in ‘fragile’ countries, 
there is a sustained degradation of functional markets, which will make it difficult for investments 
 
5 Marginal difference allows for an estimation of the differences in the slopes of two regression lines.  
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to be sustained. Third, ‘fragile’ countries suffer from lack of trust, social cohesion, rule of law, and 
economic inequalities (Silva, 2013). All these are recipes for capital flight. Finally, ‘fragile’ states 
often lack the ability to formulate and implement policies that can increase investors’ confidence 
or cushion the negative consequences of crime (Brinkerhoff, 2015).  
INSERT TABLE 7 
 
d. Estimates of a Lose Proxy for Capital Flow 
Although this is less widely used in studies, with the ‘narrow’ measure of capital flight it can be 
argued that capital flight should be based on the short-term acquisition of foreign assets by the 
non-bank private sector. The reason it is less adopted in studies stems from the fact that in today’s 
world, long-term financial assets are almost as liquid as short-term assets and should be regarded 
as close substitutes. Therefore, it is regarded as inaccurate to estimate capital flow by excluding 
long-term capital outflows. Although, data on the short-term acquisition of foreign assets by the 
non-bank private sector were not available, and thus it would have been impossible for us to 
estimate our analysis based on the ‘narrow’ measure. However, we still somehow accommodated 
for this by proxying for this ‘narrow’ measure with long-term capital outflows rather than short-
term outflows. That is, we used FDI outflows (% of GDP)6 as a lose proxy to capture capital 
outflow. Since outflows from developing countries are regarded as capital flight, irrespective of 
whether the outflows constitute the repatriated earnings of a non-resident, then reinvested 
earnings should equate to reduced capital flight. Therefore, reinvestment of earnings, and increase 
in equity capital in a foreign country in the form of FDI outflows, can be treated as part of capital 
flight by the home country (Kant, 1996). Also, according to recent arguments, capital flight is not 
 
6 FDI outflows are the sum of transactions that increase equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, and other capital by 
residents in one country for control and management of an enterprise in a foreign country (WDI, 2020). In simple 
terms, this adds to the transfer of capital abroad (Al-sadiq, 2013).  
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considerably different from any other financial flows (Ndikumana, 2014). Although, FDI outflows 
are encouraged in developing countries as a means of seeking external markets, natural resources, 
technology acquisition, etc. (Fung and Garcia-Herrero, 2012), an excessive outflow of capital can 
be undesirable, particularly, if influenced by political instability and macroeconomic uncertainties 
(Kayam, 2009). With respect to the descriptive statistics, FDI outflows for the sample of countries 
is 1.4988 (% of GDP). The results are presented in table 8. Once again, this is consistent with the 
previous results. Kidnapping rate is positive and significant to capital outflows. The estimations of 
the marginal differences also showed that this significant impact is only consistent in the sample 
of ‘fragile’ countries.  
INSERT TABLE 9 
 
e. Estimates of the Winsorized Data 
It is also important that our study controls for any potential problems with outlying values. 
Controlling for this, is another way of subjecting our results to further robustness analysis and 
ensuring consistency. Thus, we winsorized the data. Winsorization is a technique that ensures 
extreme outliers within the data are replaced with the value of the highest data point that is not 
represented as an outlier. The process ensures that the transformed data reduces the effects of the 
outliers without removing the number of observations within the dataset (Molyneuxa et al. 2019). 
The data was winsorized at different conventional levels of 1st and 99th, 5th and 95th, and 10th and 
90th percentiles. However, only estimates of the 10th and 90th percentiles are reported because the 
coefficients of the other conventional levels are very similar to those that were not winsorized. 
The results are presented in table 9. As can be seen, the results are consistent with our previous 
results on the relationship between kidnapping rate and capital flight in developing, fragile, and 
less-fragile countries.        
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INSERT TABLE 9 
6. Conclusion and Limitations of Research  
a. Conclusion 
This study presented empirical evidence of the relationship between kidnapping rate and capital 
flight in a sample of 67 developing countries over the period 2003-2017. To the best of our 
knowledge, there are no empirical existing studies on the relationship between kidnapping rate and 
capital flight in developing countries. Thus, this study has the potential to massively contribute to 
the literature of kidnapping or crime, and capital outflows. To capture capital flight, the study 
employed different measures of capital flight. The results showed evidence of a positive 
relationship between kidnapping rate and capital flight. The results were also consistent regardless 
of the measure of capital flight used. However, estimations of the marginal differences showed 
that the significant effect of kidnapping rate on capital flight is only sustained in our sample of 
‘fragile’ countries. We can deduce the following policy implications from this study.  
First, kidnapping has some deep-rooted causes in economic deprivation, marginalisation, poverty, 
government failure, etc. Therefore, it is imperative for policymakers to enact, implement, and 
sustain policies that will address some of these deep-rooted causes. Furthermore, well-functioning 
institutions (such as judiciary and law enforcement) should be properly empowered to apply 
appropriate punishments for kidnappers. Studies have shown that lack of stiffer punishment for 
kidnappers also contributes to the increase in kidnapping rates. Second, in the category of fragile 
countries, which has shown a consistent positive relationship between kidnapping rate and capital 
flight, these fragile countries should take appropriate steps in cushioning the adverse effects of 
crime. This may include developing strong institutional structures and implementing measures that 
will effectively protect the assets of owners of wealth. Third, developed countries may want to 
assist developing countries in dealing with the epidemics of crime. This is important considering 
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the potential negative impact that unchecked levels of crime can have on the vested interests that 
developed countries have in developing countries.  
b. Limitations of Research  
Regardless of the contributions to the literature and the knowledge gap that this study has been 
able to fill, there are still a few limitations. First, due to data availability, this study has not been 
able to cover all of the developing countries. Second, and again due to data availability, our study 
used the foreign assets of banks and FDI outflows to proxy for short-term foreign assets of private 
banks and short-term capital outflows by the private non-bank sector, respectively, in the 
computation of the direct and narrow approaches of capital flight. Nevertheless, as we have argued 
in the paper, this would have made negligible or no difference because in today’s highly mobile 
international capital market, a short-term asset is highly as liquid as long-term capital assets. Third, 
it would have been ideal to have also estimated with another measure of crime besides the 
kidnapping rate. Incidents of robbery could have been used. But data for the number of robbery 
incidents do not have enough coverage and had plenty of gaps. Therefore, employing this variable 
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Table 1: Sample countries. + is a sample of the ‘fragile’ countries.  
Albania Dominican Republic Kyrgyz Republic Philippines+ 
Algeria+ Ecuador Lebanon+ Russian Federation 
Armenia Egypt, Arab Rep.+ Lesotho Rwanda+ 
Azerbaijan El Salvador Madagascar Serbia 
Belarus Eswatini Maldives South Africa 
Belize Georgia Mauritius Sri Lanka+ 
Bhutan Guatemala Mexico Syrian Arab Republic+ 
Bolivia Guinea Moldova Tajikistan 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Guinea-Bissau Montenegro Thailand+ 
Botswana Guyana Morocco Turkey+ 
Brazil Honduras Myanmar+ Turkmenistan 
Burundi+ India+ Nepal+ Uganda+ 
Cabo Verde Indonesia+ Nicaragua Ukraine 
Cameroon+ Jamaica Nigeria+ Uzbekistan 
Colombia+ Jordan Pakistan+ Yemen, Rep.+ 
Costa Rica Kazakhstan Paraguay Zimbabwe 
















Table 2: Variable category and description  
Variable Category Variable definitions Expected sign 
Dependent Variables  
  
Capital Flight (% of GDP) It is the outflow of resident capital from country i in year t 
which is motivated by economic and political uncertainty. It 
is expressed as a percentage of GDP.   
Main Independent Variable  
 
 
Kidnapping rate It is the unlawful detainments and taking away of a person 
against their will in country i and in year t. This is normalised 
per 100,000 of population.  
+ 
Control Variables  
  
GDP growth (volatility) This measures the variance in growth of GDP for country i 
in year t. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy. 
+ 
Inflation Annual % change in the cost of consumer goods and services 
in country i and in year t 
+ 
Oil rents  These are the difference between the value of crude oil 
production at world prices and total costs of production i in 
year t. It is expressed in percentage of GDP 
-/+ 
Trade openness  This is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services 
in country i in year t. It is expressed as a share of GDP.  
+ 
Foreign aid This consists of disbursements of loans made on 
concessional terms and grants by official agencies to country 
i and in year t. It is expressed in per capita. 
+ 
Savings  This is calculated as gross national income less total 
consumption, plus net transfers in country i in year t.  
- 
Exchange rate This refers to the exchange rate determined by national 
authorities or to the rate determined in the legally sanctioned 
exchange market in country i in year t. It is logarithm 











Table 3: Summary statistics 
Variable Category  Mean  25th Percentile  75th Percentile  Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent Variable        
Capital Flight (% of GDP) – Indirect Approach 8.8062 1.3864 15.5556 14.8365 -65.5455 117.5610 
Alternative Measure for the Dependent Variable       
Capital Flight (% of GDP) – Direct Approach 6.4829 -1.3674 14.7361 17.4181 -72.2909 111.4146 
Main Independent Variable       
Kidnapping (per 100,000 of population) 1.5417 0.1460 1.2500 4.0488 0.0000 42.6690 
Control Variables        
GDP growth (volatility) 9.3778 0.1760 5.9840 36.2382 0.0000 769.9124 
Inflation  7.6521 3.0463 9.8273 8.5462 -18.8992 100.6270 
Oil rent (% of GDP) 2.8242 0.0000 1.5955 6.4779 0.0000 42.3198 
Trade Openness (% of GDP) 76.5188 51.7061 96.9152 32.0318 0.1674 200.7253 
Foreign aid (per capita) 60.6673 12.6650 82.0138 78.8612 -26.3158 669.8413 
Savings (% of GDP) 20.6835 14.1712 27.2045 10.8019 -16.3590 57.4741 
Exchange rate 586.1878 6.3593 184.4440 1695.4333 0.2051 13389.4000 
 
Table 4: Correlation matrix  
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Capital Flight (% of GDP) - Indirect Approach 1.0000          
2 Capital Flight (% of GDP) - Direct Approach 0.9582 1.0000         
4 Kidnapping (per 100,000 of population) -0.0245 -0.0245 1.0000        
5 GDP growth (volatility) 0.0786 0.0786 0.0067 1.0000       
6 Inflation  0.1059 0.1059 0.1126 -0.0573 1.0000      
7 Oil rent (% of GDP) -0.2438 -0.2438 -0.1020 0.0179 -0.1313 1.0000     
8 Trade Openness (% of GDP) 0.2836 0.2836 -0.1228 0.0867 -0.0819 -0.1043 1.0000    
9 Foreign aid (per capita) 0.3699 0.3699 -0.0252 0.0595 0.0284 -0.2312 0.3155 1.0000   
10 Savings (% of GDP) -0.4342 -0.4342 0.0096 -0.0523 -0.0758 0.3922 -0.0078 -0.1676 1.0000  











Table 5: Regression results of capital flight (indirect approach) and kidnapping rate  
Standard errors in parentheses. * significance at the 10% level; ** significance at the 5% level; and 
*** significance at the 1% level.  
Dependent Variable: Capital Flight (% of GDP) OLS Fixed Effects GMM 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Capital Flight (% of GDP), Lag   0.0397*** 
   (0.0131) 
Main Independent Variable    
Kidnapping (per 100,000 of population) 0.0485 0.0209 1.3652*** 
 (0.1383) (0.2456) (0.5182) 
Control Variables    
GDP growth (volatility) 0.0652** 0.0819*** 0.0322*** 
 (0.0262) (0.0272) (0.0001) 
Inflation  0.0111 -0.0296 -0.0850 
 (0.0242) (0.0495) (0.0629) 
Oil rent (% of GDP) -0.0397 -1.5023*** -0.0851 
 (0.0985) (0.3068) (0.0551) 
Trade Openness (% of GDP) 0.0813*** 0.2104*** 0.1051*** 
 (0.0218) (0.0519) (0.0279) 
Foreign aid (per capita) 0.0598*** 0.0556** 0.0505*** 
 (0.0089) (0.0214) (0.0075) 
Savings (% of GDP) -0.6514*** -1.1470*** -0.6176*** 
 (0.0623) (0.1271) (0.0309) 
Exchange rate (log) 0.0998 -0.0001 0.7687*** 
 (0.2465) (0.0015) (0.2236) 
Constant  12.4065*** 33.7852*** 17.3423* 
  (3.4882) (8.8292) (9.1244) 
F Stat 36.6900 10.4000  
Prob. > F/Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
No. of Obs. 510 510 496 
Country/Year Effects NO YES YES 
Hansen J-Statistic Chi (sq.)   41.6100 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) – Pr. > z)   0.6190 
R Square/Within 0.3695 0.3478   
Note: number of observations is less than 1005 (67 × 15) due to gaps in the data for some of the countries. Values in the table 










Table 6: Regression results of capital flight (direct approach) and kidnapping rate  
Standard errors in parentheses. * significance at the 10% level; ** significance at the 5% level; and 
*** significance at the 1% level.  
Dependent Variable: Capital Flight (% of GDP) OLS Fixed Effects GMM 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Capital Flight (% of GDP), Lag   0.0344** 
   (0.0141) 
Main Independent Variable    
Kidnapping (per 100,000 of population) 0.0988 0.0845 1.2467** 
 (0.1614) (0.2868) (0.4901) 
Control Variables    
GDP growth (volatility) 0.0750** 0.0728** 0.0182* 
 (0.0305) (0.0318) (0.0106) 
Inflation  0.0290 -0.0307 -0.0883 
 (0.0284) (0.0623) (0.1238) 
Oil rent (% of GDP) -0.1059 -1.7508*** -0.1460** 
 (0.1148) (0.3583) (0.0651) 
Trade Openness (% of GDP) 0.0620** 0.2032*** 0.1126*** 
 (0.0254) (0.0625) (0.0202) 
Foreign aid (per capita) 0.0577*** 0.0701*** 0.0486*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0251) (0.0068) 
Savings (% of GDP) -0.7456*** -1.3593*** -0.6921*** 
 (0.0728) (0.1514) (0.0431) 
Exchange rate (log) 0.0384 -4.1347 0.5281** 
 (0.2899) (2.5578) (0.2265) 
Constant  12.2976*** 40.7910*** 18.2122 
  (4.0766) (10.4088) (17.2006) 
F Stat 31.1100 9.7800  
Prob. > F/Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
No. of Obs. 505 505 491 
Country/Year Effects NO YES YES 
Hansen J-Statistic Chi (sq.)   44.5400 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) – Pr. > z)   37.7500 
R Square/Within 0.3341 0.3494   
Note: number of observations is less than 1005 (67 × 15) due to gaps in the data for some of the countries. Values in the table 










Table 7: Regression results of the marginal differences  
Standard errors in parentheses. * significance at the 10% level; ** significance at the 5% level; and 
*** significance at the 1% level.  
Models 1 & 2 are estimates of the indirect approach of capital flight and Models 3 & 4 are estimates 
of the direct approach of capital flight. 
Dependent Variable:  GMM GMM GMM GMM 
Capital Flight (% of GDP) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Fragile Countries  Less-Fragile Countries  Fragile Countries  Less-Fragile Countries  
Capital Flight (% of GDP), Lag 0.0315** 0.4952*** 0.0376*** 0.4794*** 
 (0.0131) (0.0165) (0.0124) (0.0199) 
Main Independent Variable     
Kidnapping (per 100,000 of population) 0.0489*** 0.0185 0.2083*** 0.3703 
 (0.0120) (0.0131) (0.0419) (0.6557) 
Control Variables YES YES YES YES 
Constant  0.2254*** 0.1430*** 14.5354 19.2559*** 
  (0.0656) (0.0319) (15.0057) (4.0470) 
Prob. > F/Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
No. of Obs. 494 494 491 491 
Country/Year Effects YES YES YES YES 
Hansen J-Statistic Chi (sq.) 41.8200 36.8300 44.2000 35.6000 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) – Pr. > z) 0.7160 0.1140 0.4420 0.1490 
Note: number of observations is less than 938 (67 × 14) due to gaps in the data for some of the countries. Values in the table have 
been approximated to 4 decimal places. 
Control variables are included, but for brevity these were not reported because the results are mainly the same with previous 
estimations (tables 5 & 6).  
 
Table 8: Regression results of capital flight (lose proxy) and kidnapping rate 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significance at the 10% level; ** significance at the 5% level; and 
*** significance at the 1% level.  
Model 1 is an estimate of the full sample and Models 2 & 3 are estimates of the marginal 
differences.  
Dependent Variable: FDI Outflows (% of GDP) GMM GMM GMM 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  All Sample Countries Fragile Countries  Less-Fragile Countries  
FDI Outflows (% of GDP), Lag 0.6605*** 0.7714*** 0.6507*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0143) (0.0124) 
Main Independent Variable    
Kidnapping (per 100,000 of population) 0.3526*** 0.4911** 0.1845 
 (0.0572) (0.1913) (0.1559) 
Control Variables YES YES YES 
Constant  -0.9610 6.4124*** -0.6184 
  (1.4797) (1.4668) (0.5345) 
Prob. > F/Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
No. of Obs. 494 494 494 
Country/Year Effects YES YES YES 
Hansen J-Statistic Chi (sq.) 41.6800 31.4900 40.8900 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) – Pr. > z) 0.112 0.1730 0.1110 
Note: number of observations is less than 938 (67 × 14) due to gaps in the data for some of the countries. Values in the table have 
been approximated to 4 decimal places. 
Control variables are included, but for brevity these were not reported because the results are mainly the same with previous 
estimations. OLS and Fixed effects estimates are also not reported because they are mainly the same with previous estimates (tables 




Table 9: Regression results of the winsorized data  
Standard errors in parentheses. * significance at the 10% level; ** significance at the 5% level; and *** significance at the 1% level.  
Models 1, 2 & 3 are estimates of the indirect approach of capital flight. 
Models 4, 5 & 6 are estimates of the direct approach of capital flight.  
Models 7, 8 & 9 are estimates of the lost proxy for capital flight. 
Dependent Variable:  GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM 
Capital Flight (% of GDP) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
 All sample Fragile Less-Fragile All sample Fragile Less-Fragile All sample Fragile Less-Fragile 
    Countries  Countries    Countries  Countries    Countries  Countries  
Capital Flight (% of GDP), Lag 0.1105*** 0.0458*** 0.5247*** 0.0344** 0.0376*** 0.4794*** 0.6605*** 0.7663*** 0.6507*** 
 (0.0137) (0.0102) (0.0125) (0.0141) (0.0124) (0.0199) (0.0123) (0.0128) (0.0124) 
Main Independent Variable          
Kidnapping (per 100,000 of population) 1.8527*** 0.1053*** 0.3252 1.2467** 0.2083*** 0.3703 0.3527*** 0.5535*** 0.1845 
 (0.5071) (0.0346) (0.5312) (0.4901) (0.0419) (0.6557) (0.0572) (0.1713) (0.1559) 
Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant  15.9116 12.7288 10.7638*** 18.2122 14.5354 10.1524** -0.9609 6.7789*** -0.6184 
  (11.0423) (9.2936) (2.8501) (17.2006) (15.0057) (4.0399) (1.4796) (1.4908) (0.5345) 
Prob. > F/Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
No. of Obs. 496 496 496 491 491 491 494 494 494 
Country/Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Hansen J-Statistic Chi (sq.) 43.2500 41.2800 39.1300 43.5400 41.8200 35.6000 41.6800 33.7400 40.8900 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) – Pr. > z) 0.4230 0.3840 0.0840 0.4900 0.7160 0.1490 0.1120 0.1720 0.1110 
 
